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The business firm in the United States has recently found
itself faced with a major shift in the forces which operate to
determine the usefulness of a particular executive compensation
plan. A plan is considered to cease to be useful when it does
not optimize its contribution to three basic purposes. The
basic purposes of such a plan are the satisfaction of the
financial needs of executives, the motivation of executives
toward more successful achievement of company objectives, and
the inducement it offers in the recruitment of executive talent.
The nature of the current dilemma in maintaining an effec-
tive executive compensation plan was described in Business Week
as one in which "a new (tax) reform bill, a bear market on Wall
Street and galloping inflation have thrown corporations into a
turmoil over how to pay their top executives
—
particularly those
who reap $75,000 to f100, 000 a year."
These changes have shifted the foundations upon which many
approaches to executive compensation have been built. Therefore,
Ipeter F-. Drucker, The Practice of Management (New York:
Harper and Row, 1943), p. 63.
A Confusing Payday for Men at the Top," Business Week ,
(October 10, 1970), p. 80.

it was considered timely to undertake a review of the executive
compensation problem with the aim of identifying viable alter-
natives which are available to the firm. Rudimentary to this
review is the establishment of a frame of reference with regard
to the major considerations around which an executive compensation
plan is developed.
RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question explored in this study is:
What are the major considerations in developing a viable executive
compensation plan for a business firm?
In order to properly respond to this question, it is
necessary to consider the following subsidiary questions:
1. What are the major elements of an executive compensation
plan?
2. What are the factors external to the firm which impact
on an executive compensation plan?
3. What compensatory options are open to the firm?
4. What are the motivational aspects of executive compen-
sation?
5. What are some significant innovative trends in executive
compensation?

SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The study is approached from the point of view that the
executive compensation dilemma facing industry today is
sufficiently revolutionary in implication that a comprehensive
review of the foundations of such a plan is in order. Therefore,
the scope of the study will include an analysis of the major
elements of an executive compensation plan. The focus of this
analysis will be organized in terms of base salary, bonuses, and
deferred compensation.
Preliminary research has indicated that base salary, and to
a lesser degree deferred compensation, intended to serve the
security needs of the individual executive, offers fewer oppor-
tunities for innovative approaches to compensation than do
bonuses and other devices which relate to fostering the entrepre-
neurial spirit. Therefore, emphasis will be placed upon
identifying the options available to the firm in this latter
area. The study will attempt to look at each major option in
terms of its basic nature, its advantages, and disadvantages from
the viewpoints of both the firm and the individual and the
circumstances which foster its use.
Current literature on the subject of executive compensation
is replete with suggestions for more effective management of
compensation programs, approaches for greater personalization of
programs to meet individual executive needs and predictions
concerning the form executive compensation will take in the 1970'
s
Several noteworthy proposals will be presented in summary form.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research for the study consists primarily of secondary
sources. The theoretical approach is considered superior for
the purposes of this study since the emphasis is on what ought
to "be, not on what is being employed to provide suitable executive
compensation.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The study is structured to incrementally develop a frame of
reference which could serve as the basis for formulating an
executive compensation plan for any publically held business
firm. Each of the major areas of consideration is related to the
overall environment and selective factors of major consequence
In. each of these areas is explored in greater depth.
Chapter II identifies the elements of an executive compen-
sation plan and provides an understanding as to how these
elements relate in providing the structure of a comprehensive
pXan. Chapter III explores the major influences from outside
the firm which can have a significant impact on a plan. Chapter
IV ts an in depth study of the various forms of stock options;
the historical means of building an entrepreneurial incentive
Into executive compensation. Chapter V explores the motivational
considerations of both stockholders and top executives. Chapter
VI provides an exposure of some current innovative trends in
executive compensation. Chapter VII contains a summary and
conclusions from the data presented in the preceding chapters.

CHAPTER II
MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AN EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION PLAN
The focus in studying the elements of an executive compen-
sation plan will be from the point of view of the top two or
three executives in a business firm. Executives at these levels
in a corporate structure are in a position in which they bear
responsibility for success or failure of the enterprise. In
addition, they are usually individuals who have proven themselves
to be of exceptional caliber and represent an asset upon which
the fortunes of the business are dependent. Therefore, it can be
appreciated that the executive compensation structure has to be
designed to attract men competent to accomplish company objectives
and motivate them to seek greater responsibility in the company.
A comprehensive executive compensation plan for these top
caliber executives and their understudies can be seen to require
the granting of a competitive basic salary and a means to provide
a reward for achieving success in the management of the corpora-
tion. A third requisite of a plan is to provide a means by which
an executive can hope to eventually retire and have a sufficient
income to offer him the opportunity to enjoy the pleasures he had
to forego during his active pursuit of corporate success. Thus,
-'-Arch Patton, Men, Money and Motivation (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), p. 67.

executive compensation is a three part package. The amount of
base salary has been identified as reflecting a man 1 s value in
the market place,. It has been said that the measure of a man's
esteem in the eyes of his associates remains his salary. -*- Supple-
mental compensation in the form of bonus and profit sharing plans,
incentive compensation, and other similar devices provide motiva-
tion for the executive to maximize his contribution to the firm.
The third general category of compensation needs fall under the
heading of protective compensation. This includes pension and
other retirement plans, insurance, and deferred compensation. 2
The remainder of this chapter will be spent in investigating
each of these three elements of executive compensation.
BASE SALARY
The term base salary rather than salary is used intentionally
to connotate that fixed portion of an executive's compensation
with the inference that there is an opportunity provided for
additional compensation in some other form.
Most companies have base salary schedules. These provide
not only a reflection of the expected pay one would receive as he
advances up the hierarchial ladder in the firm, but also says
something about the nature of the authority and responsibility
structure within the firm.
1,,What l s a Good Man Worth?" Bu siness Week, (June 1, 1968),
P. 58.
William D. Trader, "Guideposts to Executive Compensation
Planning," in Compensating Executive Worth , ed. by Russell F.
Moore (New York: American Management Association, 1968),
pp. 13-14.

Two typical salary arrangements, representing both ends of





















SOURCE: This table was constructed by the author based upon data














The steep pyramid is more representative of the organization
established and run with an iron hand by an entrepreneur. The
flat pyramid too often characterizes companies which are run by
a form of committee management. The big difference is that more
than anything else the shape of the salary schedule reflects the
difference in demands on individuals in the respective firms.
There are other generalizations about the two extreme salary
schedule arrangements which have been observed as a result of
analyzing executive compensation surveys in American industry.

8The following table has been developed to Illustrate general
characteristics identifiable to the spectrum of salary schedules
between the steep and flat pyramid extremes. The total compen-
sation for individuals in the steep pyramid arrangement is more
typically dependent upon sizable bonuses added to base salary as
a reward for successful performance.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF SALARY PYRAMID CHARACTERISTICS
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF

































Salary schedules within a particular company are not truly
arbitrary determinations. A company has to compete in the market

place for talent to fill all jobs from the production worker
level to the top executive positions. Therefore, the base of a
company's salary pyramid is dependent upon the wage it has to
pay for its production and office workers. These rates are most
often established by unions which have an Impact within an entire
industry. The first level of salaried workers above the union
members are paid at a level slightly above the union rates. *-
Within the various levels of a company heirarchy of salaried
workers, it is customary to find a differential in pay provided
for increasing levels of responsibility. This differential not
only provides a basic financial motivation to encourage indivi-
duals to aspire for increased renumeratlon. It also has signifi-
cant status implications.
There is much difference of opinion on compensation regarding
the choice of 5%, 10%, 15%, etc., differentials as arbitrary
spreads between the various salaried levels. These differentials
are not truly arbitrary but in reality appear to be significantly
determined by the competitive climate within an industry for
certain types of talents such as financial specialists, marketing
analysts, and engineers. These people, when placed in positions,
serve as key determinants of salary spreads within levels of the
salary schedule. If a company is required to pay a middle
management level financial analyst $25,000, others in a similar
^Patton, Men, Money and Motivation
, p. 74.
2Ibid
. , p. 104, and Richard H. Allaway, Jr., "Developing the
Basis for Executive Compensation," Compensating Executive V/orth ,
ed. by Russell F. Moore (New York: American Management Associa-
tion, Inc., 1968), p. 40.
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hierarchical level will also be paid in that range.
The salary of the chief executive tends to place the lid on
the top of the schedule. This effect can be illustrated through
considering a public utility firm. There is a natural inclination
to avoid paying a public utility executive an astronomical salary
since to do so would be to engender the wrath of the citizenry.
However, such a firm is in competition for top level talent for
management positions below the chief executive. Therefore, it
can be expected that there will be a considerable compression of
salary differentials in such an industry resulting in a flat
pyramid structure near the top.
Salaries of individuals rarely decrease; therefore, there
is a natural tendency for companies to be conservative in setting
salary schedules. To do otherwise would tend to burden the com-
pany with a fixed cost which could be severely detrimental in
pperiods of recession or general declining sales. Companies tend
to be unwilling to use base salaries as a means of adjusting an
individual's compensation up or down in relation to his perfor-
mance or that of his company for two basic reasons. It is felt
that an executive should have the right to expect stability in
that part of his compensation upon which he is dependent for
meeting his personal financial affairs and standard of living.
In addition, salary has come to be regarded in the business
community as a relatively stable element. Consequently, a cut in
J- Ibid . pp. 38-39.
2Graef S. Crystal, "What's Ahead in Executive Compensation?"
in Compen sating Executive Worth , ed. by Russell F. Moore (New
York: American Management Association, 1968), pp. 16-19.
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salary carries with it the connotation that the person involved
has been all but fired.
Base salary, as a current cash payment for services rendered,
becomes a less attractive financial reward for the highly paid
top executives because it is subject to the "progressive Income
tax." There have been recent changes in personal income tax
rates which will be discussed in some detail later in the paper.
However, for the purposes of a more complete treatment of salary
the following should be noted. In the early 1960's, an executive
receiving a raise in base salary from $100,000 to $110,000 would
find the raise of $10,000 subject to a 91$ tax, assuming other
aspects of his financial structure were not operative. The
maximum rate was later lowered to 70%, As a result of the 1969
tax reform bill, the maximum tax will become 50$ in 1972 coupled
with a number of conditional provisions. From this brief dis-
cussion, it can be seen that the role of salary is to a great
degree dependent on tax considerations in the higher earnings
brackets. Executives are obviously concerned with maximizing
the after tax income. The role of salary in the compensation
mix cannot be considered independent of its comparative advan-
tages over other alternatives.
Before leaving the subject of base salary, it must be
pointed out that the level of base salary has tended to play an
important role in the other facets of the total executive
compensation package. It is common for bonus payments and
retirement pay to be expressed as percentages of base pay or
1 Ibid., p. 17.
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salary. Therefore, while it certainly can be a disadvantage on a
short term basis to have a high base salary subject to high tax
rates, this can be offset by the positive effect base salary has
on determining the dollar amount of bonus and retirement benefits.
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPENSATION
Supplemental compensation is regarded as any form of compen-
sation which attempts to link the individual executive's personal
interests with the interests of the corporate shareholders. The
goal is to develop the executive compensation plan which will
enable shareholders to reap greater dividends and provide
executives with an opportunity to enjoy the greater financial
rewards and recognition through efforts in pursuit of company
goals. Supplemental compensation can take a number of forms
such as bonuses, profit sharing plans, incentive compensation or
stock option plans
„
When contrasted with base salary, it becomes apparent that
the purpose of supplemental compensation is to provide a means of
measuring and rewarding the short term contribution of the
individual while salaries tend to reflect the long term value of
the position occupied by the individual.-5 The supplemental
compensation alternatives of profit sharing, bonus payments and
stock options tend to be of varying importance to the top
Patton, Men, Money and Motivation
, p. 86.
Trader, "Guideposts to Executive Compensation Planning,"
p. 12.




executive. An illustration of how each of these compensation
devices are used by Texas Instruments Incorporated provides a
basis for understanding their nature and role.l
Texas Instruments started a profit sharing plan in 194-2 and
broadened it in 1951. The goal which led to establishing its
plan was to cause employees at all levels to identify with the
corporate objective of maximizing the long term profitability of
the firm. After each year of operation, a percentage of company
profits are placed in a trust fund. These profits are distri-
buted among employees on the basis of a specified percentage of
each dollar of base pay earned during the year in which profits
were generated. Individual's proceeds from profit sharing are
accumulated in the trust fund where interest is earned from
investments of this money. After four years an individual is
entitled to draw out his funds with interest payments. This
feature is intended to encourage employees to remain on the
payroll. Employees can choose to have their money invested in
company stock rather than leaving it in cash in the trust.
This method of compensation does provide an accrual to the
top executive as well as all company employees. However, its
primary orientation is much broader than purely executive compen-
sation. Exposure of this author to a similar use of profit
sharing by General Electric Company tends to confirm this broad
compensatory role for which profit sharing has been used in
American industry.
"P. E. Haggerty, "incentives and Their Roles in the
Development of Texas Instruments Incorporated" in Incentives for
Executives , ed. by David W. Ewing and Dan H. Fenn, Jr. (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 141-164.
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Bonus plans in theory represent an attempt by industry to
provide a means of singling out exceptional performance with one
time financial rewards. Texas Instruments is said to use them
as a means "to reach, in a particular and individual way those
men who have been especially responsible for the major successes
of Texas Instruments and to furnish additional incentive for their
continued success." 1 At Texas Instruments, bonuses typically are
paid to key management people as well as scientists and engineers.
Bonus payments as incentives are often spoken of in less
then favorable terms in much of the literature. It appears that
a key to an effective bonus system is the establishment of
objective criteria for the selection of appropriate candidates
for recognition. The tendency over a period of time has been for
at least minimal bonuses being paid to almost everyone in the top
executive group. 2 Graef Crystal has pointed out that because of
the above phenomena, bonus payments to worthy recipients have
become lesser percentages of base salary thereby losing much of
their theoretical motivating potential.
A difficulty in allocating bonuses has been the lack of
ofjective measures of performance. Management by objectives as
espoused by such respected management writers as Peter Drucker
and George Odiorne has been adopted in principal by some corpora-
tions. One benefit which might be expected from such an approach
is the establishment of a performance measure, accepted and
understood within a company, which could revitalize the adminis-
1 Ibid., p. 155.
2Crystal, "What's Ahead in Executive Compensation?" p. 20.
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tration of bonus plans.
The stock option is basically an entrepreneurial incentive
and as such is the strongest motivator for prodding the profit
making instincts of top executives.-1- Texas Instruments uses
stock options as an incentive for future individual performance
and never as a reward for past accomplishments. It is felt that
in exercising his options, an executive makes a strong personal
commitment to the firm. For a number of years the extensive use
of stock options as a compensatory device has been most heavily
favored among top executives. One major contributing factor for
this phenomena is that stock options have provided a means of
avoiding the loss in income from the high personal income tax
brackets these individuals found themselves in due to their
sizable salaries.
Stock options by themselves do not cause miracles in the
establishment of an executive's estate or in causing the executive
to be successful in achieving significant profit and corporate
growth. Arch Patton feels that for stock options to be effective
four basic ingredients must be present. * The industry in which
the company exists must be one in which aggressive action by
management can result in a substantial impact on the company's
growth. The executive must be in a position in the company in
which he has sufficient opportunity to influence company growth.
The individual given stock options must be in a financial position
-•-Patton,- Men, Money and Motivation
, p. 231.
2
Haggerty, "incentives and their Role in the Development of




such that he realizes a tax advantage from stock options as
opposed to some form of cash compensation,, Patton's fourth
ingredient is that the individual should be given options of
sufficient value to serve as a substantial motivator.
The variety of ways in which stock options can be provided
is considerable. It seems that the proliferation of forms in
which stock options are offered has grown in response to shifting
tax structures. These variations and the more technical aspects
of stock options will be Illustrated in greater detail in a later
part of this paper.
There are two aspects of stock options which have to be
recognized in even such a non-technical discussion as has been
presented. Stock options basically permit an individual to
purchase a specified number of shares of company stock at a
bargain price. However, in order to take advantage of this option,
he has to either have or obtain funds to meet the purchase price.
If the funds have to be borrowed, the individual will have to pay
interest on the money. This can significantly reduce or absorb
the potential personal profit from the transaction.
Another factor which is operative is that stock options not
only have specified time frames in which they must be exercised
but also these options usually lapse if they have not been
exercised prior to the departure of an executive for other
employment.
One area, in which stock options have been particularly
effective is in their ability to attract particularly well
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qualified executive talent to small corporations with very high
growth potential. Arch Patton has stated that the executive
staffing of the small high growth corporations in the 1950 's
and early 1960's achieved by offering stock options as a reward
for the entrepreneurial risk of company building would not have
been otherwise possible. 1
PROTECTIVE COMPENSATION
The third part of the overall executive compensation package
is designed to provide for the future needs of the individual as
well as protect present payments from excessive tax erosion. In
the area of -providing for future needs fall such compensatory
devices as insurance and pension programs. Deferral of compensa-
tion provides not only a means of putting off the receipt of
monies until the executive's tax bracket may be lower but also
tends to provide a sense of security in that the timing and
2
amount of payments in future years can be depended upon. The
deferral of compensation does not simply imply a steady Income,
above pensions after retirement; normally an executive will begin
to receive a steady stream of previously deferred payments during
his later years of employment with a company. This makes the
individual's take home pay less subject to the cyclical swings in
in business activity which directly impact bonus payments and
provides a flow of funds from which stock options can be exercised.
Arch Patton, "Are Stock Options Dead?" Harvard Business
Review , XLVIII (September-October, 1970), p. 21.




This aspect of the executive compensation package does not by
nature represent a dynamic area of study e The deferral of compen-
sation is a most significant aspect of a compensation program but
it rises to importance as a result of other aspects of the total
compensation package not as a causitive force in and of itself.
Therefore, it is usually given consideration as an option to be
selected by an executive who is receiving a particular financial
reward he has earned through on the job performance. The selec-
tion of the particular form in which deferred compensation will be
taken is an individual matter dependent on such factors as age,
income, family status, and personal worth. -*-
Insurance programs normally include at least a simple term
insurance policy. The variations of life insurance policies are
limited only by the imagination of insurance company sales
personnel and the willingness of corporations to pay the bills.
A corporation can provide up to $50,000 of life insurance for
each employee through payment of premiums and deduct the premiums
on its income tax returns. This is a relatively low cost benefit
which can be offered by a corporation resulting in a significant
savings to employees. An insurance program also has tradition-
ally included a program for basic medical coverage, hospitaliza-
tion and surgery under a group plan such as Blue Cross and Blue
Shield in which both the employer and employee share premium
Ijohn P. Hyde, "The Total Management- Compensation Package,"
in Compensat ing Executive Worth ed. by Russell F. Moore (New York:
American Management Association, Inc., 1968), p. 255.
2Frederick C. Kurtz, Associate Professor, The George
Washington University, School of Business Administration, Lecture




Pension plans are basically programs under which an employee
who retires from a firm is given a specified amount of money based
on his salary during a specified period during his active employ
for a company. Such a plan in which the employee also contributes
a portion of his pay or a portion of deferred compensation is
generally more broadly termed a retirement plan. Both of these
means of providing a source of retirement income are characteris-
tically encumbered with rules which stress the necessity for the
employee's continuing in the company's employ to become eligible
for payment. There is a recent trend toward payment of a termina-
tion benefit from the retirement fund to employees who leave a
p
company prior to their eligibility for retirement.
Insurance and pension provisions are not considered as
particularly significant to the subject of this report but the
limited discussion of their existance serves to provide a broader
dimension to the executive compensation spectrum.
In this section of the thesis, emphasis has been on identi-
fying the basic elements of an executive compensation program.
At this point it is important to note the significant role that
Tax considerations play in determining the form of compensation
most favorable to both the executive and the firm. It will be
from this frame of reference that more detailed analysis will be
presented.







ON AN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN
It has often been said that "no man is an island." This
time worn cliche can also be applied to a company in formulating
an executive compensation plan. In developing a plan to incent
its top level executives, a company cannot hope to maximize the
contribution it -will make to both the individual executive and the
stockholder -unless it succeeds in giving due consideration to
major externally imposed rules under which it musL operate.
The corporation is in effect a separate entity in the
American economy and as such is subject to the controls and
limitations imposed by government. Tax laws are one area which
is particularly significant in evaluating the cost-benefit
comparisons among compensatory options. In addition, the com-
pensation environment of 1971-1972 is subject to the limitations
of the Pay Board rulings made under Phase II of President Nixon's
economic recovery program. A third significant external factor
which has an influence on a corporate executive compensation plan
is recognition of the possibility that the Internal Revenue
Service may disallow part of the deduction for compensation on
the basis that it is unreasonable. While these are not the only
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external factors which a corporation has to consider, they are
considered the three which today are imposing the greatest con-
straint on the formulation of an executive compensation plan.
In this chapter each of the three areas will "be discussed in
detail in order to provide a factual "base for further discussion
of compensatory options.
TAX STRUCTURE CHANGES
In the 1950' s and early 1960's the top personal tax rate was
as high as 91% while the capital gains tax was 25%. This situa-
tion obviously encouraged executives to seek compensation in a
form in which the more favorable 25% rate could be paid.-1-
In 1964 Congress made revisions to tax laws to provide an
incentive which would encourage the economy to grow more repidly.
Among the provisions of these tax law changes was a reduction in
the maximum tax rate on personal income from 91% to 70%. A
corollary impact of this change was that the differential between
personal income tax rates and capital gains rates was narrowed
from 66% to 45%„ Other provisions were that stock options had to
be exercised within five years rather than ten and the executive
was now required to hang onto stocks obtained by option for a
minimum of three years to get capital gains treatment as compared
to the previous six month holding period. 2
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was trumpeted by Congressmen as a
measure which, would eliminate the tax shelters by which over 225
Top Men Demand New Kinds of Pay," Business Week
,




Americans earning over $200,000 in 1968 paid no tax. In 1970,
112 persons -with incomes above $200,000 paid no federal income
taxes. Representative Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.) in commenting on
the 1970 situation reaffirms the primary objective of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 when he said, "The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was
supposed to end this grand-scale tax avoidance, but it is obvious
now that it has not done so."^ This tax law was the one which
has caused a proliferation of articles on the shift in executive
compensation devices.
The impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was no surprise to
some astute corporate business executives. This is evidenced by
the testimony of a number of individuals before the United States
Senate Committee on Finance. Among those testifying was Leonard
E. Kurst, Vice President and General Tax Counsel of Westinghouse
Electric Company. He testified to the effect that deferred
income, particularly in the form of capital stock was vital to
the interests of American businesses since it provided a means of
inducing top quality employees to remain with a company and it
provided a real incentive for executives to give superior per-
formances since they had a proprietory interest in their company. 4"
This testimony obviously did not have an effect since the
1Arthur M. Louis, "Hidden Jokers in the New Tax Deck,"
Fortune, LXXXII, July 1970, p. 112.
"income Tax Drops; Loopholes Persist," The Washington Post ,
January 3, 1972, p. D9.
5Ibid. ."
hJ. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Hearings before the Committee on Finance, Senate,
91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 1038.
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provisions of the then proposed law which were objected to were
included in the law as passed.
Initially the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was greeted with
optimism by many of the ill-informed since it provided for a
reduction in the maximum tax rate on earned income from the then
current rate of 70 percent to 60 percent in 1971 and 50 percent in
1972. Earned income was a new term in the tax bill and was
defined to include salaries, bonuses, and other compensation paid
currently but excluded dividends, capital gains and such deferred
compensation as pensions and profit sharing.
The earned-lncome provision lowering personal tax rates was
offset in the tax bill by a provision which singled out eight
types of income that had previously been either tax free or
subject to some form of favored treatment and imposed on them a
10 percent penalty tax. Two of these tax-preference items which
will have a significant effect on the highly compensated top
executives are: the difference between the exercise price and
the market price of qualified stock, at the time it is purchased,
will be treated as regular income and one-half of any net long-term
capital gains will be subject to a 10 percent penalty tax.
Under the 1969 tax law, capital gains taxes increase from a
maximum of 25 percent of total net gain to 29-1/2 percent in 1970,
32-1/2 percent in 1971, and 35 percent in 1972. 5
The following figure has been constructed to illustrate







the trend in the tax structure relationships between personal
income taxes and capital gains taxes. The figure is "based on the
data previously presented.
FIGURE 1

















1963 1964 1969 1970 1971 1972
SOURCE: Constructed from data presented by Arthur M. Louis in
"Hidden Jokers in the New Tax Deck," pp. 100-102, 112.
From this figure it is obvious that the advantages of finding
a means for compensating an executive in a way which will provide
application of the capital gains tax rates are rapidly diminish-
ing. When the penalty tax provisions are taken into consideration,
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it is possible that many executives in higher brackets will find
the risks of stock options greater than the present value of
potantial gains.
An illustration of the effect of the tax laws in dollars and
cents comparing the tax in 1969 and again in 1972 on a hypotheti-
cal executive is in order. Assume the executive in question has
$150,000 of taxable earned income and other income consisting of
$300,000 in net long-term capital gains in both years. Under
the old law he would have been taxed $76,980 on the earned income
and 25^ of the $300,000 or $75,000 on capital gains. His total
tax bill would have been $151,980.
Under the new law the computation is much more complicated
and will be illustrated in Table 3. Thus, under the new law the
hypothetical executive would pay $181,974 in 1972 compared with
$151,980 in 1969 or an increase of $29,994 in taxes under the new
law on the same earnings.
Under the 1969 tax law an executive also was caused to lose
some tax deductions on investment interest if this was in excess
of a minimum sura of $25,000 on joint returns. If an executive
was borrowing in excess of $250,000 at 10$ ($25,000 interest),
only one-half of the amount of interest above $25,000 could be
used as a tax deduction under certain conditions. The entire
deduction can be taken as an offset to dividends if the dividends
are more than or equal to the interest in excess of $25,000.
The major impact on pensions and profit-sharing income is
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Tax on Capital Gains
25$ on first 50,000












NOTES 1. If capital gains income exists, one-half of such
income is treated as a tax preference item bringing tax on
income up to the tax level under the pre-1969 law of 76,980.
2. Tax applied at various escalating rates up to 35$.
SOURCE: Constructed from data provided by Louis, "Hidden Jokers
in the New Tax Deck," p. 102.
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these plans will be taxed as ordinary income in the year the
payment is actually received rather than as previously at capital
gains rates. Any appreciation in value of funds held in trust
will continue to be taxed at the capital gains rates. This seems
to be an attempt to discourage the deferral of income. If the
executive's income is less in the later years, placing him in a





The tax structure is likely to become even more bleak in the
future. In an attempt to prevent a few highly paid individuals
from avoiding taxes, more stringent tax provisions are likely to
be written into law. Representative nenry S. Reuss (D-Wis.),
senior member of the House Banking Committee, and Representative
James Corman (D-Calif.) are co-sponsoring a tax reform bill which
2they will introduce in Congress in early 1972. This bill is
designed to plug more "loopholes."
The tax provisions previously discussed are almost entirely
effective on the income of executives. The corporation tax
structure as it relates to the compensation of executives has not
changed under the recent tax law changes. For analytic purposes
the corporation tax is at a constant marginal rate on income,,
The tax rate is 22 percent on all income up to $25,000 and 48
percent on all income over $25, 000. ^ The effective differences
in cost-benefits to the firm in comparing alternative means of
1 Ibld., jp. 112.
^"income Tax Drops, Loopholes Persist," The Washington Post
,
January 3, 1972, Sec. D, p. 9.
^Eugene F. Brigham and Fred J. Weston, Managerial Finance
(3rd ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969) , P- 37.
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compensation lie in the fact that some options provide the firm
with tax deductions while others do not. These differences will
be pointed out when specific options are discussed in detail.
PHASE II - EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONTROLS
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced his far
reaching program to bring about economic recovery in the United
States. His initial action placed a 90 day freeze on wages and
prices. The longer term effect of this program which is to
impact on executive compensation programs is beginning to be
understood under guidelines for executive compensation laid down
by the Pay Board on 17 December 1971. A summary of the more
significant provisions of the Pay Board' s ruling on executive
compensation follows:
The salaries and other compensations of executives
cannot exceed 5.5 percent of their value during the
established base period.
The base period from which a company can compute the
5.5 percent increase is any one of the last three fiscal
years of the company ending before November 14, 1971.
An employer with a formal compensation plan in effect
cannot exceed the amount of incentive compensation paid and
bonuses payable or number of units of stock available for
options by more than 5.5% of that of the base period,,
An employer cannot adopt a new plan or revise an
existing executive compensation plan, program, or practice
without the approval of the Pay Board.
An employer wishing to obtain an exception from the
basic provisions of the policy must provide evidence that
the plan is an incentive program related to a productivity
increase, -*-
"Boards Text on Executive Compensation," The Wall Street
Journal
,
December 28, 1971, p. 6.
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It can be appreciated from the above summary that a signifi-
cant question to be asked is, "What was the level of compensation
for executives during the base period?"
A compensation survey released by McKinsey in August 1971
showed "that pay for chief executives in 577 of the largest
U, S, corporations rose by only 0.6 percent last year (1970) "-1-
However, this should not provide a significant restraint since a
number of large companies such as General Motors paid their exe-
cutives handsome bonuses in 1968 and 1969, the first two years
under the three year base line rule. The companies who are
expected to be hurt are those companies such as International
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation whose top executives get
half or more of their pay in the form of bonuses, which have been
growing at 15 to 30 percent a year over the past three years.
^
In these instances bonuses constitute the heart of their executive
compensation plans. With these held to a 5.5 percent increase
and no alternative precedent established for stock option plans
which could offer offsetting growth potential their executives
can expect to feel the squeeze.
The salary and benefits portion of executive compensation
plans in most companies will feel no effect from the rulings.
Consultant Robert Sibson, President of Sibson and Company said:
"Pay at the Top Feels the Freeze," Business Week
,
August 28, 1971, p. 39, parenthesis added for clarity.
Bonuses as Usual—But Not for All," Business Week
,




The problem that most companies face is that applica-
tion of the maximum limits of the guidelines -would result
in pay increases greater than companies would otherwise
grant their non-union employees
.
One implication of the stock option ruling which prohibits
an increase in the number of shares above that in the base
period is that the earlier grants of shares were made in a
period of a bull market in which fewer shares than normal were
granted due to their inflated price. With the current market
depression an equivalent compensation will require the granting
of a greater number of shares.
There seems to be a general feeling among Washington
businessmen that the present stringent Phase II controls are a
short lived -phenomena. This feeling is endorsed by Herbert
Stein, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors
who said he believed "we will get back to the prefreeze era of
no controls" and that "we can live without controls and without
inflation, "^ In the same reference Stein was said to have
predicted that all but major firms might be exempt from controls
by the end of 1972. If this latter comment becomes a reality,
large corporations will certainly have to take into consideration
the Impact of the Pay Board guidelines on executive compensation
at least through 1973«
UNREASONABLE COMPENSATION CLAIMS
One of the most common corporate tax problem areas is the
1 Ibid.
2Most D. C. Businessmen Believe Controls Will End," The




disallowance by the Internal Revenue Service of part of the de-
ductions they claim for compensation. This is particularly true
of top executive compensation. This problem is expected to be-
come more severe as time passes. Some of the reasons cited are
that IRS agents with the aid of computers are able to compare
executive compensation for comparable positions in companies of
similar size within similar industries. Disgruntled employees
appear to be more prone to talk with people outside the firm
about closely held corporate information on compensation matters.
In addition, as previously referenced, there has been considerable
attack from Congressional representatives on high salaries and
tax avoidance techniques relative to top executive compensation.
As a result of this pressure a new procedure has evolved
whereby an executive will reimburse a corporation for any portion
of his salary which is disallowed as unreasonable by the Internal
Revenue Service. He would then be entitled to a tax deduction in
the year in which the repayment is made. 3 To comply with this
new procedure a corporation has to have an obligation of this
nature established in writing in either its by-laws or directors
minutes.
The problem of an issue of unreasonable compensation arising
in a closely held corporation is most likely to arise through the
investigative efforts of the Internal Revenue Service. Publicly
Robert S. Holtzraan, "How to Cope with 'Unreasonable
Compensation 1 - Claims, " Harvard Business Review, XLIX (September-





held companies are usually challenged on the reasonableness of
compensation by small stockholders.
The most successful defense against such claims in negotia-
tion with the Internal Revenue Service, stockholders, and the
courts has been the ability to illustrate in some manner that the
compensation has been based on company profits. Therefore, it
can be expected that there is a strong tendency within American
industry to develop an executive compensation plan which in
theory, at least, is tied to company profits.
This unreasonable compensation issue can work for the em-
ployee as well as the employer. If in bargaining for a raise, an
executive is advised that there is corporate fear of an unreason-
able compensation disallowance he can remind his employer that,
if his request is unreasonable, the Internal Revenue Service will
disallow it and he will repay the excess compensation. The
individual executive under these conditions is much more likely
to be in a position and more motivated to justify his worth than
would a corporation. In addition, stockholders would not be in a
strong position to object to compensation not disallowed by the
Internal Revenue Service.
5
In this chapter it has been illustrated that the tax aspects
of executive compensation are in fact becoming more complicated.
The differential between taxes on ordinary income and capital
Walter S. Rothschild, "Legal Problems of Executive
Compensation,." in Compensating Executi ve Worth , ed. by Russell F





^Holtzman, "How to Cope with Unreasonable Compensation
Claims, " p. 81.
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gains is becoming significantly more narrow. There is today a
much greater chance that corporations will have executive com-
pensation tax deductions disallowed as unreasonable,,
To this restrictive environment is added the controls
established by the Pay Board under Phase II of President Nixon's
economic recovery program, A significant implication of this
program is that over the next two years, at least, a corporation
which does not have an executive compensation plan which has been
revised to properly consider the Tax Reform Act of 1969 or which
has not been formalized will be required to show a relationship
between incentives and increased productivity to obtain Pay Board
approval.
The fact that an attractive executive compensation plan is
hard to maintain in a tax environment was pointed out by Dale
Yoder even before the current more restrictive tax laws were
passed. In 1962 he pointed out that:
Programs of executive compensation have not been
successful in maintaining the historic differentials in
executive pay. The structure has narrowed. Executive
pay has not maintained its earlier ratio to profits.
Progressive income taxes now cut deeply into executive
salaries and limit opportunities for saving
.
-J-Dale Yoder, Personnel Management and Indu strial Relations





Stock options have been a central point of discussion in
many of the recent articles on executive compensation. Much of
the discussion has been caused by the impact that the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 has had on this compensatory device,, The recent
proliferation of copy on the subject is also indicative of the
very significant importance stock options have been given in top
executive compensation programs. The high regard for stock op-
tions was pointed out by Arch Patton in the following quotation.
Based on my experience with stock option administration
in many client companies throughout the 1950' s and 1960's, I
am convinced that such options made a measurable contribution
to the dramatic upswing in industrial production. The stock
option not only equated executive and stock holder interest,
but also provided the basis for making profit building an
exciting and rewarding activity. 1
In this chapter an indepth study of stock options is
presented. The Initial emphasis is given to developing an
increased understanding of the various types of stock options
which are being offered as executive compensation media. This
includes an illustration of the relative mix in which the various
options are now used, and an explanation of each type of option
in terms of its basic distinguishing characteristics. The tax
effects and commonly cited advantages ana disadvantages of each
^Arch Patton, "Are Stock Options Dead?" Harvard Business
Review , XLVIII (September-October 1970), p. .21.
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from the point of view of both the corporation and the individual
executive are also presented. The final portion of the chapter
highlights major considerations in the use of this compensatory
device.
Stock options have "been offered in five major types. These
types are qualified stock options, non-qualified stock options,
phantom stock, restricted stock, and tandem stock. One essential,
although often subtle, difference is the affect of each on the
tax liability of both the executive and the corporation. This
tax effect has been a prime cause in the recently observed shift
in the relative use of each of these forms of compensation.
Figure 2, developed by McKinsey and Company from a sampling
of 165 large companies in a mix of industries illustrates this
significant shift. It also shows the expected continuation of
this shift over at least the next two years.
PERCENT
FIGURE 2























SOURCE: "Top Men Demand New Kinds of Pay," Business Week,
January 23, 1971, p. 65. This figure was prepared by McKinsey




In addition to the change in the mix, the overall use of
stock options has shown some decline., The McKinsey study
indicated that in two-thirds of the companies surveyed fewer
executives are getting options and two-thirds of the companies
also were reported as making smaller grants. However, most
companies are said to want to use some form of option as a long
term incentive. This is confirmed by one of the findings of the
Sixth Annual Management Compensation Study conducted by Sibson
and Company, management compensation consultants,, One of their
principal findings was that stock option plans are not dead. They
are simply being overhauled to make them more effective in the
light of current stock market and tax conditions.
There is a practical side to stock options which may also
account for much of the effort being given to adjusting the mix
of option types rather than retreating to salary and bonus
alternatives,, Robert D. Hulme points out that, "With the
tremendous number of tender offers being made, it is always nice
for the company that wants to continue its own identify to have
stock in friendly hands. "^
QUALIFIED STOCK OPTIONS
A qualified stock option plan is one which is developed in
accordance with specific Internal Revenue Service guidelines in
1 Ibid.
Robert E. Sibson, "Executive Pay—A Time of Dramatic
Change," Nations Business , November, 1970, p. 89.




order that the recipient of the option can be eligible for
taxation on financial gains at capital gains rates. The speci-
fic conditions of the qualified stock option are:
The plan must be approved by shareholders and the total
number of shares reserved for options over the life of the
plan must be specified.
The plan must expire no later than ten years after it
Is first adopted.
The option price per share must be at least equal to
the fair market value of the stock as of the date any option
is made.
An individual option must be exercised within five years
from its date of grant.
The optionee must be an employee of the company and,
after the grant has been made, may not own more than 5
percent of the total shares outstanding. (This rule has
been somewhat liberalized for very small companies.
)
The optionee may not exercise an option so long as
another qualified option granted on an earlier date and
carrying a higher option price per share is currently
outstanding.
The optionee must hold an option for at least three
years after its exercise in order to qualify for long term
capital gains treatment on all appreciation which occurred
between the date of the grant and the date of exercise.
The total appreciation that may occur when an option is
eventually sold is basically considered to consist of two parts.
The first part is the difference between the option price and the
market value on the date the option is exercised. This is
referred to as the spread. The second part is the gain in
market value which occurs between the time of exercise and the
-^Arthur M. Louis, "Hidden Jokers in the New Tax Deck,"
Fortune , LXXXII, July 1970, p. 112.
2Graef S. Crystal, Financial Motivat ion for Executives ,
New York: American Management Association, 1970, pp. 199-200,
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time the stock is sold. The first part is the portion of
appreciation which will be taxed as ordinary income unless the
stock is held three years from exercise. The second part is
eligible for capital gains treatment six months after the
exercise period.
In addition to the above required provisions of a qualified
stock option plan, a company also can impose additional restric-
tions on such a plan. It is not uncommon for a company to
restrict the percent of the grant an executive can exercise in
p
one year. The usual intent in such cases is to strengthen the
chains which bind an executive to one company,. This is particu-
larly true when a company does not issue stock options each year.
The company is not permitted to claim a tax deduction for
qualified stock options since the recipient is getting the
preferential tax treatment. Assuming a marginal corporate tax
rate of 48 percent, a corporation could issue the same number of
shares of a type of stock option which is tax deductible for a
net cost of 52 percent of the qualified stock.
5
Contrary to much public opinion, a company does realize a
cost when an individual is given a stock option. The cost is
the discount the option holder gains through the stock's appre-
ciation between the time of the grant and time the option is
exercised. While this does not show up in the company income
statement, it is an opportunity cost in that the stock could have
1Ibid .,,p. 201.
2Ibid., p. 202.
^George W. Hettenhouse, " Cost/Benefit Analysis of Executive




been sold on the market on the day of exercise. Shareholders
also feel an additional cost of qualified stock option grants
since earnings per share decline because of the increase in the
total number of shares outstanding.
There is an advantage to the corporation of the stock option
in terras of funds flow in that there is no loss in working capital.
The amount the executive pays the company to exercise his option
is in fact a one time increase in working capital.
The exercise of a qualified stock option requiring the
executive to hold the stock for three years for capital gains
treatment can present serious problems of financing. With the
reduced spread between capital gains treatment and earned income
taxes the differential can easily be absorbed by the present high
interest rates. The relationship between borrowing to exercise
options and the income level of the individual concerned is also
a significant factor. A middle management executive would likely
find himself in a personal income tax bracket of about 30 percent.
If he borrowed funds at 10 percent to exercise his option, he
would be paying a net after tax interest rate of 7 percent since
he could deduct 30 percent of his interest. A top executive in
the maximum 50 percent bracket would pay only a net interest rate
of 5 percent. This fact coupled with the fact that the middle
management executive is paying a personal income tax rate close
to what his capital gains tax rate would be brings home the fact
^Graef S, Crystal, "The 10 Commandments of Executive
Compensation," Financial Executive , August 1970, p. 53.
2Richard E. Wettling, "An Up-to-Date Look at Stock Options
and their Use," Compensating Executive Worth , ed. by Russell F.
Moore (New York: American Management Association, 1968).
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that the tax advantages to qualified stock options reside only in
those who have very large incomes. Crystal points out that on
the above basis qualified stock options do not make sense from a
cost-effective standpoint for any executives regardless of how
much they are paid.^
The provisions of the qualified stock option requiring an
exercise of options within five years of the date of grant and
the first-in first-out rule have worked to the greatest disadvan-
tage to the executive. The decline in stock market prices in
1969 and 1970 occurred at a time when many executives had to
exercise their options or lose them. Coincident with the decline
in the economy there was a rise in interest rates to combat
inflation. Thereby, in addition, those who had exercised options
earlier found themselves forced to sell them prior to the three
year capital gains treatment holding period in order to protect
the loans they had made to buy the stock.
NON-QUALIFIED STOCK OPTIONS
Arch Patton defines a non-qualified option as any option
wfrich does not meet Bureau of Internal Revenue tax qualifications
for capital gains treatment. ^ More specifically, non-qualified
stock options are identified by the following characteristics.
1. They can be made effective for any number of years
as compared to the five year limitation on qualified options








2. They can be offered at a price below the market
price on. the day they are granted.
3. They are tax deductible for the corporation as a
salary expense at the time they are exercised by the
recipient.
4. The recipient must pay tax at ordinary income rates
on the appreciation gained between the date granted and the
date exercised.
5. They do not have to be exercised in the sequence in
which they were granted and you can exercise a non-qualified
option even if you have a qualified option outstanding.
6. There is no three year holding period as is
applicable to qualified stock options.
Non-qualified options have been in existence for some time
but they are becoming more popular now that the capital gains
differential has all but disappeared. It is obvious from the
above list of characteristics that they offer the executive more
flexibility than do qualified options. Patton sees the increased
flexibility as a detrimental characteristic from the view of the
company in that they do not fill the entrepreneurial need. 2
Some arguments offered in support of this opinion are that,
since they are offered below the current market price, it is
advantageous to the recipient to exercise them more quickly.
Since profit is treated as current income, executives are being
forced to sell some of them at the time of exercise in order to
pay taxes. This is acting counterproductive to the objective of
having executives buildup personal equity in the enterprise.
Another objection is that any differential between market value
and option price at the date the option is granted is paid to the
^Louis, "Hidden Jokers in the New Tax Deck," p. 112.
2Patton, "Are Stock Options Dead?" p. 29.
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individual by reducing the equity of public shareholders.-'- As
in the case of qualified stock options the corporation realizes
an opportunity loss on the difference in market price between the
date of the grant and the date of exercise.
The non-qualified option is advantageous to the executive
since he does not have to borrow money for an extended period of
time since there is no minimum holding period. However, he does
have to hold them for six months as does any stock purchaser to
make any appreciation in value after the date of exercise eligible
for capital gains treatment. However, if the company has a
tendency to pressure its executives to hold stock, he will be
little better off with a non-qualified option than he would have
been with a qualified stock option. He will in essence be forced
voluntarily to continue to borrow the funds required to finance
2the stock over a long period of time.
PHANTOM STOCK
Phantom stock plans have been in use for a number of years
but were previously used primarily as a deferred compensation
device in conjunction with developing retirement income sources.
Nov; companies have started to use the idea on a short term
basis. ^ With phantom stock plans, the company credits an execu-
tive's account with a block of imaginary stock shares. The books
1 Ibid., p. 30.
2Crystal, Financial Motivation for Executives
,
p. 232.
3"Top Men Demand New Kinds of Pay," Business Week
,
January 23, 1971, p. 66.
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are kept as if actual shares of stock had actually been set
aside. When the company pays dividends, it will be assumed that
the phantom share is generating dividends at that rate. In cases
of stock splits and stock dividends comparable treatment exists.
Under some plans the full value of the fictitious stocks is
eventually distributed to the executive. Under others, only the
amount of any gain in market value between the time the stock was
credited to the account and the established distribution date is
paid out. For example: Corporation A credits an executive with
500 shares currently selling on the market at $100. After a
stipulated waiting period of 5 years in this hypothetical case,
the market price of the stock has risen to $175. In addition,
dividends have been received and reinvested into more shares of
phantom stock during this period. The executive would then get
the appreciation on each share originally granted ($75 x 500 or
$37,500) and additional payment for the reinvested shares
(10 x $175 or $1,750). His total compensation would be $39, 250. 2
The company would obtain a tax deduction for $39,250 at the time
of exercise.
He will have to pay the personal income tax rate of 50$,
assuming his other income places him in this tax bracket. If the
plan has been developed with a risk of forfeiture provision, the
income will not be subject to additional taxes under extraordin-
ary income provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The for-
feiture requirement is usually met by a provision which causes
^•Louis, "Hidden Jokers in the New Tax Deck," p. 101.
2




the executive to relinquish his ownership claim to the phantom
stock if he leaves the company before the payoff date.l
From an individual executive's point of view, the tax
aspects of phantom stock plans which contain significant deferral
provisions are somewhat uncertain. Some tax men feel that, in
addition to ordinary income taxes, gains may also be subject to a
special tax as deferred income.
Used in conjunction with company bonus plans, the phantom
stock can serve as a means of conserving working capital for the
firm as well as providing an additional relationship between the
financial well being of the firm and the individual. In addition,
it does not provide a threat to shareholders' equity. However,
Arch Patton is quick to point out that it does not provide the
entrepreneurial incentive value resident in qualified stock
options in their better days.^
It can be seen that since no funds are required of the
executive in order to take advantage of this form of compensation,
it is attractive to executives at all levels within the corpora-
tion. However, too broad a use of this device can cause the
cost of a company's compensation plan to increase drastically in
a time of rapidly rising stock market prices. The market price
increase may not be accompanied by a parallel increase in the
financial fortunes of the firm.
1 Ibid. -





Grants and options of restricted stock should not be
confused with restrictive stock options granted before the 1964
Revenue Act was passed. The earlier restricted stock options
were the predecessor of the qualified stock option. They could
be granted for a ten year period, at a price as low as 85 percent
of the market value as of the time of the grant and could be sold
by an executive six months after exercise and two years after the
grant with capital gains treatment on any gains
.
The options and grants of restricted stock are characterized
by restrictions on the resale of the stock for a number of years
except back' to the company at its original price. In addition,
the executive is usually required to forfeit the stock if he
leaves the company before the restriction period has lapsed e No
tax was assessed on it until the restrictions had lapsed. At the
time of sale the executive is taxed at ordinary income tax rates
on the difference in value between the price he paid for it and
the fair market value as of the date of the grant or option.
When the stock was sold, the executive paid long-term capital
gains taxes on any appreciation above the fair market value on
the date of the grant.
^
Restricted stock was the best of all worlds between 1967 and
I969. Used in an option, it gave the executive the capital gains
tax treatment of a qualified stock option and the flexibility of
Harland Fox, Top Exe c utive Compensation , New York:
National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1966, p. 6.




option price and length of exercise period characteristic of a
non-qualified option. 1
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 gave this incentive particular
attention. As a result the executive who receives restricted
stock finds himself faced with a large decision. Within thirty
days of the grant he has to decide whether to pay a tax at once,
based on the market value at the time of this grant, or whether he
will wait until restrictions lapse and pay a tax on the market
value at that tme. The problem is that, if he pays tax at the
time of the grant, he gets no tax refund if the value of the
stock has decreased at the time restrictions lapse. Another
significant provision of the Tax Reform Act was that, if the
executive chose to pay tax at the time restrictions lapsed, he
would pay all tax at ordinary income rates based on the final
market price. 1
The corporation is eligible for a tax deduction under this
type of option. It is essentially the same from a corporate
point of view as the deferred stock bonus form of the phantom
stock option. One minor difference is that the restricted stock,
since it often must be sold back to the company, can be non-
registered stock. However, the savings in not registering stock
are relatively insignificant and company executives tend to
bitterly resent this rather unsubtle device to force them to hold
onto their option stock.
^
-'"Louis, "Hidden Jokers in the New Tax Deck," p. 111.




Tandem stock options typically combine both qualified and
non-qualified options. They are used in two ways. One form is
for a company compensation committee to grant either qualified
or non-qualified options as they consider appropriate,. The other
version is to grant the executive both kinds and let him choose
which he will exercise up to a specified amount. 1
For example, the executive could be granted a five-year
qualified option and a ten-year non-qualified option. If the
executive had not exercised either option during the first four
years after the grant and the market conditions were unfavorable
to exercise- his qualified option before it expired, he would not
lose his compensation but rather could exercise the non-qualified
portion of this tandem in more favorable markets between the
fifth and tenth years. 2
David Kraus of the McKinsey and Company attributes much of
the current popularity of the tandem plans to the fact that they
provide "a hedge against still more tax law changes in the
future."
3
The current literature on executive compensation includes
considerable discussion of the need to individualize executive
compensation plans. The tandem plans in a small way accomplish
this by giving the executive a limited choice in optimizing his
personal needs in light of the conditions he is faced with in the
tax and market environments.
1
"Top Men Demand New Kinds of Pay," p. 66.
2Patton, "Are Stock Options Dead?" p. 33.





All the preceding discussion indicates stock options have
been an important part of an executive's total compensation. The
relative importance of grants is illustrated by a comparison of
the size of the grants and the executive salary level.
Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., conducted a survey of 450
executives in a variety of companies. From this survey, they
developed a chart in which the stock option grants during a five
year period were converted into multiples of base salaries.
These five year multiples were then compared with annual base
salary to graphically illustrate the relationship. An adaptation
of this presentation is included as Figure 3.
This chart illustrates that option grants increase as
salaries increase in more than a straight line relationship.
The size of the stock option is also shown to be quite large at
the higher levels. For instance, based on the averaged data
provided in the table, it would be expected that an executive
receiving an annual salary of $100,000 a year would receive
stack options of 7.0 x $100,000 or $700,000 value in a five
year period. Of course the size' of the grant does not automa-
tically relate to the actual income received. However, it does
Illustrate that the more highly paid the executive the greater
his opportunity for appreciation in income as a result of
appreciation -in the value of company stock. In addition, it
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SOURCE: This figure is based on a similar chart constructed
using a logarithmic scale by Graef S. Crystal in Financial
Motivation for Executives
, p. 206.
becomes obvious that granting stock options can have a significant
effect on the distribution of equity ownership in a company.
COST OF STOCK OPTIONS AND VALUE OF REWARD
In previous discussions of stock options it has been pointed
out that there are cost differentials among various alternative
plans. In addition, the implication has been established that
the value of the reward to an executive can vary among options as
well as in the timing of receipt of payments.
These are realistic issues which must be analyzed and
quantified in establishing and administering an executive compen-
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sation program. Therefore, it is considered appropriate to
provide an illustrative computation from the point of view of both
the corporation and the executive. The computation illustrated is
based on a similar computation made by George W. Hettenhouse.
Assume the hypothetical executive is 55 years old. He is
being offered a $1,000 phantom stock option -which will be deferred
for 10 years and paid as a lump sum at his retirement. Addition-
ally, assume that upon retirement he would be in a 30 percent
marginal tax bracket. If he dies before his retirement, the lump
sum will go to his wife who will be in a 25 percent tax bracket.
According to mortality tables, the probability of his surviving
is .86. 2
The after tax payment to the executive would be $1000 x .70
or #700 and for his survivor it would be $1000 x .75 or $750.
The expected payout based on mortality rates is $700 x .36 +
$750 x .14 or $707.
If the executive feels he has an after tax opportunity cost
of 5 percent, the present value of this after tax payment is
$707/(1. 05) 10 or $434.03.
From the company's point of view, assume the marginal tax
rate is 48$. Thus, the after tax cost of the $1000 is $520.
However, if the company can wait ten years to pay this money, it
has the opportunity to use this money to realize an expected
annual internal rate of return of 10 percent. 5 Therefore, the
Hettenhouse, "Cost/Benefit Analysis of Executive
Compensation," pp. 117-118.
2Ibid.





cost of the plan to the company would be $520/(1. 10
)
10 or
$200„46. Thus, reduced to a dollar basis, the cost to the firm
Is J. 46 for every dollar realized by the executive.
This technique can be used to compute various alternatives.
The results of each of the computations can then be ranked in
terms of relative costs to the firm and benefits to the executive.
The final decision is likely to be made not only from this
analytic base but also with due consideration for subjective
factors. •*
COMPANY SIZE AND GROWTH RELATED TO CAPITAL INCOME
In establishing an executive compensation plan in which
stock options are intended to play a major part, a company can
expect to have to be competitive if it is to attract and hold
required executive talent. Therefore, it is considered signifi-
cant to highlight what the results of a competitive stock option
plan would be expected to yield to the top executives. Sibson
and Company conducted a survey of the three top executives in 150
companies. They determined the paper profits made by these
executives from 1965 through 1969. The results of these findings
is the establishment of norms for capital income comparisons
shown in Table 4.
-'-Crystal, "Financial Motivation for Executives," p. 227.
2Robert -E. Sibson, "Executive Pay--A Time for Dramatic
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NOTE: This study is based on options exercised by the top three
executives in each of 150 companies. Low growth rate companies
are those with an annual rate below 5 percent; medium, those with
growth rates of 5 to 12 percent; high, those with growth rates
above 12 percent.
SOURCE: Robert E. Sibson, "Executive Pay—A Time for Dramatic
Change," Nations Business , November 1970, p. 96.
The study reveals that in small high growth companies, stock
options are a significantly greater portion of income. Also, it
appears to indica.te that there is a correlation between the
growth performance of a company and its policy with regard to the
use of stock options.
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Sibson points out that, companies tend to reach a size where
a sustained growth of more than 12 percent annually becomes
difficult to achieve. 1 One implication of this observation is
that the role of stock options in an executive compensation pro-
gram should be adjusted over time to remain in step with the
entrepreneurial opportunity in the firm.
Perhaps the type of individual who will best meet the needs
of the firm, as its chief executive, changes over time. This issue
is dealt with in the next chapter as part of the consideration
of the motivational aspects of executive compensation.




MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Up to this point the dominant theme of this study has been
the identification of financial reward devices and the tax
aspects of each. However, this emphasis provides an incomplete
picture of an executive compensation plan. A firm does not
exist to pay executives; the various means of paying an executive
are perhaps less important than why the executive is retained and
paid in a particular way. Crystal makes this point succinctly
when he suggests one precept of an executive compensation plan
should be "no taxation without motivation. 1
A company, through the consciousness of its stockholders,
retains the services of an executive in order to endow the
organizational entity with the capability to satisfy certain
2
expectations. If stockholders have discernable objectives, it
seems reasonable to assume that the efficiency of the company in
meeting these objectives is more likely to be achieved when
executive compensation plans are purposefully developed to
encourage performance in desired directions.
In this chapter the works of behavioral scientists and
management consultants sensitive to the motivational aspects of
1 Crystal, "The 10 Commandments of Executive Compensation,"
P. 53.
2Peter F. Drucker, "Management's New Role," Harvard Busines s
Review , XLVII (November-December 1969) p. 50.
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incentives will be drawn on to explore this subject from the
point of view of both the firm and individual executive.
MOTIVATIONS OF THE OWNERS OF THE FIRM
The relationship of the owners of the business enterprise and
its management would likely be defined differently if we were
considering closely held family owned and operated firms,
publicly held firms or cooperative business enterprises. For
the purpose of the discussion the emphasis will be placed on the
large publicly held firm.
In the publicly held enterprise the relationship between
owners and managers is essentially financial. In considering the
rationality of this relationship as it relates to corporate
objectives the conceptualization illustrated in Figure 3
emerged in the mind of the author. This conceptual framework
will serve as the focal point for considerations in this section
of the paper.
The economic objective previously mentioned and the more
broad perspective shown in Figure 3 are perhaps understood in
terms of the following quotation.
Ask any businessman, and almost any business student
what the objectives of the firm are, and the answer is
loud and clear: "profits." A second thought might add
such related goals as "survival" and "growth," and a more
thoughtful answer might even qualify this with the
addition of ... "through the creation of economic utility. nl
•^Wilmar .F. Bernthal, "Value Perspectives in Management
Decisions," in Vol. II of Current Issues and Emerging Concepts
in Management , ed. by Dalton E. McFarland~(2 vols.; Boston:
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Profitability is a general terra which can mean different
things to different investors. It can mean the excess of returns
over expenditures or the rate of return on invested capital
.
This level of consideration is not sufficiently definitive to
provide a formulation of corporate objectives on which an
executive compensation plan can be built.
Individual investors entrust their funds to particular
companies not only to obtain profits but also because they have
preferences in the nature and timing of their rewards. An
additional ingredient in an investor decision appears to be his
concept of acceptable risk. An individual's acceptable level of
risk is usually defined as that point where the pain from a
dollar lost is equivalent to the pleasure of a dollar gained.
This point usually increases in direct proportion to the amount
p
of wealth possessed by an individual.
An investor who makes an investment because he desires a
constant level of dividends, would likely be attracted to a
company such as American Telephone and Telegraph who has paid a
dividend consistently since the 1920' s and is characterized by a
conservative price earnings ratio of 20 to 1 or less.-^ In
contrast, an investor who is not adverse to risk and is more
interested in growth potential than he is in a steady stream of
dividends would be more likely to invest in stock of a company
^Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary , Springfield, Mass.:
G. & C. Merriam Co., 1953, p. 674.
2
Brighara and Weston, Managerial Finance
, pp. 224, 271.
•^J. Keith Butters, ed. , Case Problems in Financ e (5th ed. ;
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), p. 234.
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such as H. Ross Perot's Electronic Data Corporation. When the
first offering of this stock was placed on the market in 1968, it
sold at 118 times earnings and further appreciated in price
50 percent in the first week.
The significant point is that, once a company establishes a
reputation as a dividend payer or a growth company, it attracts a
particular interest group of stockholders. When this relationship
has become established the financial objectives of the firm have
been established. The corporation then has assumed an obligation
to conduct its business in such a way as to maximize the
achievement of this objective.
In establishing an executive compensation plan, the firm
should have this expectation in mind and design the plan to
encourage growth, maintain a particular dividend payout, ensure
a particular return on investment ratio or maintain a particular
earnings per share ratio, as appropriate. Graef Crystal makes
this point by stating that a plan should "incent only what you
want to incent." 2
When a stockholder invests in a firm he is doing so with the
expectation that the company is a going concern. That is, he
expects there is an obligation upon management to maintain the
permanency of the firm by protecting its productive assets.
3
1,,Perot's EDS: Entrepreneurial Archetype," MBA , Vol, VI,
No. 3, December 1971, p. 45.
Crystal, "The 10 Commandments of Executive Compensation,
p. 56.
3Robert N. Antnony, Management. Accounting
,
Text and Cas es,





This function of the chief executive can serve as a measure of
his competency. In an instance where product market conditions
are severely depressed, a manager who successfully minimized
losses, perhaps to a greater degree than a competitor, is an
appropriate subject for a reward since he is properly optimizing
the long term interests of the firm. 1
Peter Drucker has said that the responsibilities of
management not only include administrative duties such as keeping
the firm solvent and operating smoothly in a current environment.
Management also has a responsibility to take action to ensure the
long term growth of the firm through seeking and meeting
entrepreneurial opportunities. 2
In some firms these opportunities are greater and therefore
should be given greater emphasis as objectives of the firm. This
brings to mind another aspect of management responsibilities to
stockholders. It has been pointed out by behaviorial scientists
that there is in fact a life cycle phenomena which is observable
in American business enterprises. Dr. Gordon Lippitt spoke of
this in terras of a crucial conflict theory.
5
This theory holds that a company follows a pattern of six
stages in its development. Failure to meet each subsequent
problem leads to decline. At each of these stages a critical
1 Crystal, "The 10 Commandments of Executive Compensation,"
p. 56.
2Drucker, "Management's New Role," p. 53.
^Gordon Lippitt, Professor of Behaviorial Sciences, The
George Washington University. Lecture presented to students
enrolled in course Management 207, Human Behavior in Organization
on the subject of Behavioral Considerations in Organizational
Change and Renewal," October 5, 1971.
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issue is faced which requires a different emphasis from
management. Table 5 is based on the author's concept of this
theory as it relates to the requirements of management emphasis
and changing growth potential,,
TABLE 5







































Internal develop- Future growth
ment of people and dependent on
products for future internally
generated resources
Lippitt illustrated this concept's application to an
American corporation when he said, "Henry Ford II did a good job
in the 1950' s and early 1960's in meeting the survival needs of
his company,. Now he should step down and put in a professional




This discussion brings to mind two significant character-
istics which relate to stockholder and corporation objectives.
First, to the extent the growth potential of firms change and the
riskiness of business ventures change, a shift in the stockholder
community may result. That is, the objectives of a firm are
dictated by more than the stockholder desires. Second, the
critical problems facing a firm change over time requiring
different management emphasis to maintain the permanence of the
firm.
In meeting these changing requirements, a shift in emphasis
of an executive compensation plan to recruit and hold the desired
talent would appear to be in order. Arch Patton, in referring to
this aspect of executive compensation, said a particular company
has "committed the cardinal recruiting sin of attracting men
whose competitive characteristics did not happen to be compatible
with the industry environment. 1
An astute stockholder community in today's environment
expects its management to maintain a reputation as a morally run
business entity with concern for social responsibility and
customer satisfaction. It is becoming recognized that "to the
extent the firm is unwilling to further these higher goals, its
own existence will be short lived." 2 The fact that social
performance as well as financial return is in the vanguard of
Arch Patton, "What is an Executive Worth?" Management of
Human Re so urces , ed. by Paul Pigors, Charles A. Myers and F. T.
Malm, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 394.




stockholder preference is accented by a new publication dedicated
to corporate social responsibility which, first appeared in
January 1972 entitled, Business and Society Review . One
regular feature of this publication will guide stockholders to
companies that emphasize social performance. Companies mentioned
in the first issue as exemplary in this respect are Chase Man-
phattan Bank, Xerox, and Weyerhauser.
It would then seem that an executive's reward should be
influenced to some degree by the impact he has in leading his
firm toward meeting a reasonable level of social performance.
This subjective area gives some perspective to the "man for all
seasons" nature of the executive's responsibilities to stock-
holders. Relating this to an executive compensation program is
not easy. As Patton says, "the most difficult aspect of the top
level executive job to judge is the contribution the incumbent
makes to company policies that go beyond his functional
responsibilities. "^
MOTIVATIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE
What can be done to direct the energies of executives toward
the achievement of those objectives which attract stockholders to
the firm. The standard answer for years has been to give them
money. Saul W. Gellerman says of this folklore concerning money:
luThe Message Is 'Responsibility,'" Business Week ,
January 8, 1972, "pp. 22-23.
2 Ibid.
^Patton, "What Is an Executive Worth?" p. 393.
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Everyone knows why money affects the motivation of
workers.
. .money is supposed to be the main reason, if not
the only one, that most people have for working at all.
Knowing how to motivate is supposed to consist largely of
knowing how to dangle money as artfully as possible before




Even on the surface this seems to be an over simplification
when one considers how different individuals are: how their
financial situations differ; how their ages differ; how their
family situations differ. It has also been observed that the
individual executive's reaction to a particular means of compen-
sation varies at different stages in a career. 2
The time worn rhetorical question arises--"What makes Johnny
run?" In recent years management has turned to behavioral
scientists in an attempt to get the answer to this question.
In attempting to understand the motivations of top level
executives, it was found that two particular behavioral science
theories seem to provide a useful frame of reference. Abraham H.
Maslow's "Hierarchy of Needs" theory explains what within the
manager makes him succeptible to being motivated. ^ Frederick
Herzberg's "Hygiene vs. Motivators" theory goes a long way toward
giving clues as to what within a company's realm of practicality
can be used as media of motivation.
iSaul W. Gellerman, "Motivating Men with Money," Fortune,
LXXVII, No. 3 (March 1968), p. 144.
2Patton, Men, Money and Motivation
, p. 35.
3Abraham H. Maslow, "The Study of Man at His Best...,"
Behavioral Science Concepts and Management Application , ed. by
Harold M. F. Rush "[New York: Natio'nal Industrial Conference
Board, Inc., 1969), p. 17.
^Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time: How Do You Motivate
Employees?" Harvard Business Review




In applying motivation theory to an executive compensation
program, it must be remembered that motivation is defined as the
state of having an internal drive that incites the individual
to some kind of action.-*- The problem facing management then is
to sensitize the individual toward the desire for satisfaction of
some basic needs and provide a set of conditions through which
the sensitized needs can be accomplished. Table 6 illustrates




MASLOW S "HIERARCHY OF NEEDS"
NEED LEVELS EXPLANATIONS
1. Physiological Bodily requirements such as food,
clothing and shelter
2. Safety Physical and emotional security
3. Belongingness and Love The need for other people
4. Esteem Self respect and respect from others,
worth, adequacy, competence
5. Self-Actualization Know thyself—then being what one is
capable of becoming
This theory holds that a higher need is not attainable until
a minimum level of satisfaction is achieved in a lower level.
The first four levels are considered "deficit" needs since their
attainment is necessary for the achievement of maturity. In




contrast, the fifth need--self-actualization--is a growth need.
Its achievement is rare and attainable only by superior people.
The best a company can do to encourage self-actualization is to
provide an environment in which the superior individual can
develop. This is an environment in which an individual acquires
an emotional identification with an objective or set of objectives
which results in his imparting increased creative energy in his
efforts. 2
In his theory of "Hygiene vs. Motivators" Herzberg recognizes
that factors which operate to provide job satisfaction and
motivation are different than those providing job dissatisfaction.
This distinction is quite comparable with Maslow' s distinction
between deficit needs and growth needs. J
He says that the opposite of job dissatisfaction is not
satisfaction but rather no dissatisfaction. This description
applies to the basic deficit needs of Maslow. Elements in the
corporate bag of compensatory alternatives which are recognized
as being of this essential hygiene nature are status, salary,
security, and company policy.
Herzberg 1 s counterpart to Maslow' s growth needs are what are
termed motivators. These operate in an employee's positive
reaction to his job. He says the growth or motivator factors
which are intrinsic to the job are achievement, recognition for
1 Ibid., p. 18-19.
2Patton, Men, Money and Motivation , ' p. 23.




achievement, the work itself, responsibility, and growth or
advancement
.
If money does not motivate, as was illustrated by the fact
that Herzberg found salary not to be a motivator, then what is the
role of money in an executive compensation program? This is a
particularly poignant question above a level at which an executive
has satisfied those basic needs which are dependent upon the
exchange of money
Saul W. G-ellerman says that "satisfaction from money results
primarily from an INCREASE in income, not from income itself." 2
The implication is that money used as a form of recognition
causes it to become a motivator. However, in order forthis to
be successful a few conditions have to be met--not the least of
which is that the increment of increase has to be sufficient to
make obvious the fact that an individual has been intentionally
recognizedo Another consideration is that with increased pay an
executive usually acquires increased responsibilities* With
these increased responsibilities an individual moves from a
comfortable role in which he feels secure and self confident into
a new situation which typically carries with it uncertainties,
discomfort and anxieties. The more an individual has valued his
previous situation, the more he will have to perceive the value of
the reward to willingly accept the change. 3 The issue then is
one of balancing the impact among the basic needs of the
1 Ibid.




individual* The threat to safety and social needs must be more
than offset by the opportunity for esteem need satisfaction,,
Money in the aggregated form known as wealth has been said
to be a necessary ingredient to the credibility of an executive.
A top executive is in a position to make unpopular and unwelcome
decisions with acceptance by his contemporaries only if they
acknowledge he is making the decision in the best interests of
the company rattier than in response to an ulterior motive. This
idea is further accented by Gellerman when he said, "if there is
any single quality that is required of a man at higher levels, it
is credibility;... This is the one acceptable answer the
author has found for justifying the payment of $300,000 or more
to an executive in a year.
The works of Herzberg and Maslow indicate that attention in
an executive compensation plan should not only be focused on the
almighty dollar. Attention should also be focused on status
symbols, on the perceptions of individuals, on emphasizing the
dignity and personal worth of individuals, and on providing
security to the individual.
Individuals seem to seek recognition and a sense of
importance in terms of the values and goals they share with
others in groups. They perceive themselves as valued members of
a group dignified in the eyes of their fellow members when they






2Rensis Likert, "Motivation: The Core of Management,"
Management of Human Resources , ed. by Paul Pigors, Charles A.
Myers and F. T. Malm (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1964), p. 71
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These goals could be provided in the form of organization
goals if a system of recognition can be developed by which the
corporate goals are transformed into a form which is compatible
with individual self interests. Graef Crystal suggests this is
one of the commandments of instituting a bonus system. The
recognition among group members is at least as important to the
individual as the money. -*-
Compensation is not apt to motivate unless the individual
can perceive that he can control his performance to the extent
that he can be singled out as having been worthy of a reward.
This is one reason that some management writers emphasize the
inapplicability of stock options as a broadly used device in
corporate executive compensation programs. Crystal sums up
this consideration by saying:
Total responsibility for earnings per share,... is
typically assigned to only two executives: the chairman
and the president,...
For other executives, the correlation between their
performance and the market price of the company's stock
is undoubtedly spurious and sometimes negative.
5
In the literature of executive compensation there is much
discussion of status and status symbols as cost effective
compensatory media. A distinction should be made between the two,
Status relates to real differences in amount of accountability,
salary, and freedom of action. Status symbols refer to size of
offices, titles, separate dining rooms, carpeting, and company




^Crystal, Financial Motivation for Executives, p„ 237.
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cars. M. Scott Myers In describing a survey at Texas Instruments
has made this comments about status symbols.
Earned status is its own reward and the flaunting of
symbols or other reminders of inequality is symptomatic of
immaturity which serves only to undermine feelings of
dignity and worth of those of lesser status,... ~^-
G-raef Crystal takes the opposite point of view with regard
to the use of status symbols. He feels that no matter what
companies do to avoid the use of status symbols they are inevi-
table. People naturally assign status to those paraphenalia
which their bosses have and which they are denied whether it be a
secretary, a rug, or a coffee pitcher. Status symbols are rela-
tively inexpensive. It would be cheaper to buy an executive a
$500 rug than give him a similar raise which would become an
annual expenditure. In summing up his remarks on status symbols,
Crystal said,
I think that some companies are losing a bet when they
don't use status symbols intelligently as a means of keeping
their compensation package within tolerable means...
Status symbols provide a sort of psychic income to the top
executive and must be considered in the overall framework of an
executive compensation plan. With the increased tax impact, the
qualified stock option has become as much a status symbol as a
means for financial reward.-^
Security is becoming a matter of greater concern today than
it was in earlier years. Robert Gordon cites the increase in
%. Scott Myers, "Conditions for Manager Motivation,"
Harvard Business Review , XLIV (January-February 1966), p. 67.
^Crystal, "The 10 Commandments of Executive Compensation,"
p. 62.




pension and retirement plans for executives as indicative of this
trend. He said:
The significant point is not the nature of these
pension plans but the indication that executives are
laying increasing emphasis on security in their financial
arrangements.
This trend is cited as an indicator that within business
today there is a movement toward hiring professional managers
rather than hiring individuals who share the profit seeking
motives of business leaders of an earlier day. No evidence in
the literature on executive compensation indicated that this is
a commonly held concern. However, it does have implication in
establishing an executive compensation plan.
The cumulative effects of deferred compensation, pensions,
and retirement funds will cause the threat of the deficit needs
of individuals to become more subdued when the executive begins
to feel he has it made. ' If Maslow's theory is valid, then the
emphasis in executive compensation programs for individuals so
affected should be toward achieving self-actualization needs. It
will be remembered that Maslow made a point of the fact that only
superior individuals could achieve this level and these indivi-
duals are rare.^
However, the presence of motivation and the true self-
actualizing individual are only two of three ingredients to the
situation. These two will be wasted if the kind of organization
1Robert Aaron Gordon, "Executive Compensation as an Incentive
to Profitability
,
M in Readings in Management, ed. by Ernest Dale
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), p. 297.
2Ibid.
^Maslow, "The Study of Man at His Best...," p„ 19.
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that can use them does not exist.
The motivators built into an executive compensation program
must be compatible -with the level of impact which an organization
is willing to accept from a highly motivated individual. The
opportunity has to exist for changes in products, markets, size,
or profitability.
Peter Drucker has made a prophetic statement regarding the
impact of behavioral science theory on executive compensation
programs.
...we will, within another 10 years, become far less
concerned with management development (that is, adapting the
individual to the demands of the organization) ; and far more
with organization development (that is, adapting the company
to the needs, aspirations, and potentials of individuals).
iGellerraan, "Motivating Men with Money," p. 184.




TRENDS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
In previous chapters a broad understanding has been
developed concerning the elements of an executive compensation
plan. It has been shown that the environment in which such a
plan is effected is subject to the continuous influence of change.
Tax considerations are unstable, individual executive's needs
differ and change over time and the disciplines of the behavioral
scientists are having an impact.
Robert Saunders of Arthur D. Little, Inc. sees the present
situation as a unique opportunity. He points out the receptivity
which exists for change by stating:
Today top management can make radical changes in its
approach' to compensating senior executives with the
assurance that the need for innovative change will be
recognized by all who will be affected by it as a natural
part of our changing times. Such a favorable environment
is somewhat a rarity. 1
In this chapter information will be presented to illuminate
the trends in executive compensation which are becoming evident
as companies attempt to counteract the influences of change. The
perspective is from the view of the total compensation plan e
Therefore, in addition to stock options, the areas of bonus plans,
individualization and professional financial planning will be
considered.
1Robert 0. Saunders, Jr., "it's Cleanout Time for Executive





For years, companies have rewarded executives through plans
which have been developed for application on a group basis. With
increased recognition that behavioral science theories of motiva-
tion are valid and acknowledgement that the firm does have a
paternal responsibility, this is changing. Now some firms are
taking a different perspective. They determine what the indivi-
dual executive needs and wants and attempt to custom tailor each
executive's compensation package.
Such programs involve working with the total income concept
in terms of its cost to the company. In addition to cash based
benefits, options can be offered such as time for travel and
study, insurance programs, or variations in the timing of benefits
based on the change in short term cash needs the executive
p
experiences as his career progresses.
There are two areas of resistance to the individualization
of pay packages. These efforts are usually accompanied by
Increased cost and difficulty in administration. Also, top
executives who grew up under the more structured plans tend to
suffer from the myopia characterized by the cliche, "I've been
through this myself and know what is best for my executives. "^
A particularly noteworthy model for such a cafeteria
approach has been offered by George Hettenhouse. He bases his
N. B. Winstanley, "Keeping Executive Compensation in
Balance," Personnel , Vol. 42, No. 6 (March-April 1965), p. 31





proposal on the premise that to be practical, a plan must fulfill
three objectives.
1. "it must be built on a common base level of compensation."
That is, only executives with earnings in excess of a certain
level, such as $50,000, would be eligible to participate in
the plan. The assumption is that, below this level the
demands on the executive's compensation to meet current
expenses act to void any real advantages.
2. "The plan must be applied to a relatively small number of
executives—those who already exercise some choice among a
variety of payment packages. This rule is based on the
fact that administrative costs are considerable.
3. "The plan must offer a reasonable number of attractive
alternatives." The emphasis should not merely be on offer-
ing alternative payment streams of a particular compensation
device but should also provide choices among a number of
devices.
Hettenhouse proposes to employ a computer oriented cost-
benefit analysis of options based on the present value concept.
The effect of various combinations of compensation devices in
terms of the individual's tax bracket and financial situation are
ranked by the use of computer simulation. The unalterable
element in the computation is the total cost ceiling assigned by
the company as the executive's level of compensation.
Crystal feels that individualization of compensation plans
through the use of a cafeteria approach greatly enhances the
motivational value of compensation since it more directly caters
to individual needs. He sees some need to discipline the
approach to the extent that long term as well as short term
objectives of the firm are given credence. However, he strongly
opposes the attachment of the "golden handcuffs" approach to
-'•George W. Hettenhouse, "Compensation Cafeteria for Top
Executives," Harvard Business Review , XLIX (September-October,





this system. That is, if executives are going to choose deferral
options, they must do so with assurance they will not have to
forfeit such payments upon premature termination of employment
with the firm.
In conclusion, he predicts, "more and more companies will
individualize more and more of their executive compensation package
over the next ten years."
The cafeteria approach to compensating top executives does
not result in optimizing the financial situation of the executive
unless it is based on sound financial planning.-^ Top executives
are characteristically so "busy they are unable to give their own
financial needs adequate attention. Therefore, a new fringe
genefit— executive financial planning—is gaining wide popular-
ity, 4
With many companies adopting such a fringe benefit, it can
be expected that it will appear in many forms and be identified
by different acronyms. One such effort called Plan FOUR (Finan-
cial Objectives Under Review) has been instituted by the United
States Trust Company of New York. It will be described as
illustrative of this fringe bene fit
Plan FOUR is applicable to certain top executives in the
^Graef S. Crystal, "What's Ahead in Executive Compensation?"
Compensating Executive Worth , ed. by Russell F. Moore, New York:
American Management Association, 1968, pp. 31-32.
2Ibid
. , p. 33.
-%ettenhouse, "Compensation Cafeteria for Too Executives,"
P. 115.
^Donald J. Petrie, "Executive Financial Planning—A New




company. Under this program, the company hires an outside
organization with expertise in law, taxes, insurance, and
banking to develop and keep updated a particular executive's
financial plan. The steps in this procedure are briefly
outlined below.
a„ The executive meets with his financial planner and
divulges all aspects of his financial situation,, In
addition, he states his personal objectives and is
evaluated in terms of his propensity for risk.
b. The financial planner, with the help of necessary
experts does a thorough financial analysis of the
executive's situation including a detailed analysis of
each of his investments.
c. The financial planner will then develop a plan and
present his suggestions to the executive for consideration.
d. A -firm plan is then drawn up and the financial planner,
as administrator, executes necessary financial transactions.
e. Periodically the plan is reviewed and updated. Each
time the executive is given a compensatory choice by the
company a decision is made with the benefit of the advice
of the assigned financial planner.
-
1-
The approximate cost for each participating executive is
$3,000 the first year and $1,000 each subsequent year. It is
said that companies tend to use organization levels in deciding
on eligibility. To be worth while, the executive must at least
be in the $50,000 salary bracket. 2
STOCK OPTIONS
Earlier in this paper, it was shown that stock options have
been the prime entrepreneurial incentive in executive compensa-






tion programs. It was pointed out that their compensatory value
was drastically affected by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the
recession of 1969 and 1970. Yet the results of the 17th Annual
Top Executive Compensation Survey conducted "by McKinsey and
Company indicates stock options are not showing a significant
loss in popularity. A trend was noted in a slow change from
qualified options toward non-qualified option plans. -*-
As was illustrated earlier in Figure 2, the Tandem stock
option appears to be the most popular means of treading water
while compensation experts attempt to find means of building the
entrepreneurial incentive back into stock options. Two such
ideas which appear promising in limited application are consi-
dered worthy of note.
In large stable corporations, the opportunity to employ the
true entrepreneur is limited to new business ventures undertaken
by the firm. In recognition of this fact some large corporations
are instituting provisions in their executive compensation plans
which provide an individual who successfully manages a new
venture to be eligible for compensation above that customary at
phis level in the organization.
The base salary of the individual is typically conserva-
tively set but the opportunity for bonuses, non qualified stock
options, or phantom stock options is greater. As a venture
^George K. Foote, "Top Executive Pay Flattens Out," The
McKinsey Quarterly , Vol. VIII, No. 2 (Fall 1971), p. 30.
2Frederick W. Cook, "How to G-ive Venture Managers 'A Piece




manager, the individual usually assumes greater personal risk
but can accrue a much greater pay-off.
^
One such plan required the executive to make an initial
investment of $10,000 in the venture which was set up as a
separate business enterprise. The major financing was borrowed
from the parent company as debt. If the venture proves successful
the arrangement provides for making a public offering of the
stock. Typically, the venture manager is given stock at a price
to estimated earnings ratio of seven to one. Therefore, at the
time of a public offering it would not be surprising to find the
stock selling at an appreciated market price of 20 or more times
earnings. The parent company will stand behind the venture
company in its founding days thereby providing the professional
management expertise and financial stability which will help
make the stock an attractive public offering.
Another innovative proposal involves the granting of
restricted stock to top executives under the stipulation that
this stock can be retained if distant quantifiable performance
targets are met. For example, one company granted an executive
(l million dollars of restricted stock with a 25 year restriction
period.^
In order to keep the full grant he was required to attain
the following performance averages over a 10 year period: sales
increase of 30 percent per year; increase in profits of 30 percent




^Crystal, Financial Motivation for Executives , p. 241.
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per year; and an annual return on invested capital of 35 percent.
With such a program the executive is typically required to
return some of the initial grant in accordance with an agreed
upon schedule if he fails to meet the maximum objectives.
Product expansion or new business ventures achieved through
the formation of new subsidiary companies provide an opportunity
to reward top executives by giving them preferential treatment
by providing an opportunity to subscribe as initial shareholders
in such public offerings. A recent example of this type trans-
action involving Kaiser Industries received wide publicity when
odisclosed.
Kaiser had established a subsidiary in Canada entitled
Kaiser Resources Limited to mine coal. As an "executive benefit"
to 36 Kaiser executives, a plan was developed to purchase the
stock through a specially set up holding company incorporated in
Canada. The executives benefited from this transaction in two
ways.
First, realizing the potential of the investment because of
inside corporate information, the executives believed the price
was a bargain, offering them an opportunity for a quick profit;
and second, "by purchasing an original issue of Canadian stock,
they could apply to the Canadian Internal Revenue Service for an
exemption from the U. S. interest equalization tax, saving them-
selves $1.80 a share tax on top of the $12 offering price. "3
^Ibid. -
2
"A11 in the Family: How Top Officials at Kaiser Set Up a




Such arrangements which are advantages to some degree
because of the availability of Inside information can raise moral
issues in the minds of the public, as happened in the above cited
case. Therefore, a very judicious evaluation in terms of the
benefit to executives weighed against the damning effect of bad
publicity has to be made. Obviously, it would be most difficult
to show that each of the 36 executives made a professional
contribution to the profitability of the subsidiary.
BONUS PLANS
In early discussions of bonus plans, it was noted that they
tended to be" tied to salary levels, they tended to reward short
terra performance, and they did not offer an entrepreneurial
incentive. In order for bonus plans to fill some of the void in
executive incentive lost through the regulatory restraints on
stock option :pay-out, some of these limitations in bonuses will
have to be overcome. Crystal has offered such an innovative
compensatory approach based on the bonus concept
.
The proposal recommends replacing the base salary with
earnings-per- share equivalents as the means of allocating bonus
payments to those executives with a significant impact on
corporate decisions. The concept assumes the corporation
establishes standards as to what is considered a desirable level
of pre-tax earnings-per- share. Based on this figure, a total
value of expected cumulative earnings-per-share for a specified
l-Graef S. Crystal, "Motivating for the Future: The Long
Term Incentive Plan, " Financial Executive , Volume XXXIX, No. 10
(October 1971), pp. 50, 52.
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number of years is computed. The executive is then paid a bonus
in earnings-per- share equivalents on the amount he has caused
earnings to exceed the desired level. He would be paid the
actual earnings-per- share attained by the company on an esta-
blished multiple of shares. If his efforts resulted in earnings
to be double the target level, the number of hypothetical shares
on which he received a bonus payment would be proportionately
increased.
This award could be made on an annual basis using the previous
years during product development as a base for computing the
standard and performance earnings-per- share measures. The number
of years earnings is based on the number of years between the
decision to market the product and its achieving profitability.
This proposal assumes that, due to the technologically
intense nature of products the correctness of a business leader's
decision is not evident for a number of years and it is often in
the best interest of the firm to undertake investments with long
pdevelopment periods before a profit is realizable.
TAX SHELTER INVESTMENTS
In an attempt to counteract the loss of capital gains tax
advantages for qualified stock options, some companies are
setting up tax sheltered investments such as apartment complexes
in which they let top management participate . 3 The idea is that
1 Ibid.
2Ibid., p. 49.
5 MTop Men Demand New Kinds of Pay," p. 65.
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such executives who are in high tax brackets can create assets out
of earning power that otherwise would be substantially reduced by-
tax payments. In addition, by becoming partners in such business
ventures, the executives gain an additional advantage by claiming
as tax deductions the expenses of operating the enterprise.-'- The
long term appreciation from such investments result in adding to
the executive's estate which can be liquidated at lower tax rates
as a source of income during post retirement years.
McLaughlin of McKinsey and Company states that "smart
companies, .. o continue to focus on performance and motivation
rather than devise gimmicky plans that maximize tax advantages." 2
Petrie, "Executive Financial Planning—A New Fringe
Benefit," p. 23.
2






An executive compensation plan has been shown to consist of
three basic elements. These are base salary, supplemental
compensation, and protective compensation. Base salary is the
most generally accepted measure of the market value of an
executive. Supplemental compensation is the ingredient by which
the performance of the executive is tied to the performance of
the business entity. Protective compensation is the catch all
phrase for the various means by which an executive builds
financial security for retirement years.
It has been shov/n that base salary levels can be correlated
with the supply and demand relationships for a particular type
of executive talent, the size of the business enterprise, and
the potential impact of an executive's decisions on the fortunes
of his company. Salary has customarily served as a significant
determinant in the allocation of bonus awards and setting pension
payment levels. Salaries are very seldom ever reduced. There-
fore, there is a tendency to reward an executive for superior
performance through the use of supplemental compensation rather
than through an increase in salary which would harness a company
to a large fixed charge in future years.
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Salaries constitute a much higher percentage of total com-
pensation for lower and middle management personnel than for those
officers of the firm who are most instrumental in making vital
decisions. However, since the salary of the top executive is the
largest paid in the firm, it must be set at a level which will
provide a realistic financial advancement path from first line
management to top executive positions. Most large firms have
formalized salary schedules in the form of a number of steps
whose mid-points incrementally increase in dollar value in pro-
portion to the average wage paid to similar positions in compe-
titive companies within an industry.
Supplemental compensation has generally been paid in the
form of cash bonuses and stock options. Bonus plans can be in
any form from a strict percentage allocation of bonus funds
available based on salary to an individualized reward for contri-
bution to the firm based on accomplishment of established
objectives. Bonus plans are not credited with being particularly
motivational unless they can be individualized and unless the
differentiation between the bonuses paid to competing contem-
poraries is sufficiently great to acknowledge superior performance.
The bonus is the most often used form of supplemental com-
pensation for rewarding lower and middle management.
Bonuses are paid on a current basis as cash or portions of
the bonus may be deferred for payment after retirement. In
determining the advisability of deferring a bonus payment, an
individual's current and estimated retirement tax bracket are
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significant. If there is not much difference in these tax
brackets, it is often found that the present value of the current
cash bonus would be greater than a deferral plan.
If a deferral plan is used, it should not be encumbered with
the "golden hand-cuffs" provisions. A truly worthwhile executive
will be unlikely to be retained by a firm using a "golden hand-
cuffs" rule since a hiring firm could offer sufficient compen-
sating incentives to more than offset the loss of deferrals.
Stock options have been the primary entrepreneurial
incentives offered by American business firms during the 1950'
s
and 1960's. They provide a means by which executives acquire a
financial Interest in the firm. On this basis, it is postulated
that the interests of the corporate executives are most likely to
be brought into harmony with the interests of the majority of
stockholders.
Stock options have been a major point of discussion in the
literature on executive compensation in the 1960's and early
1970' s. The center of attention is the effect major changes in
tax laws in 1964 and 1969 have had on the value of stock options
to executives. It has been shown that stock options have
decreased in value to the executive as a means of receiving
compensation due to an increase in capital gains tax rates and
a parallel decrease in personal income tax rates.
The qualified stock option has been made non-cost-effective
for nearly all executives due to these tax law changes. This
situation has resulted in increased interest in such other forms
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of stock options as restricted, phantom, non-qualified, and
tandem options. These alternative forms of stock options are
criticized in varying degrees because they tend to focus more on
the short range objectives of the individual executive than the
long range objectives of the firm's stockholders.
These alternative stock options are being implemented with
varying forms of restrictions "which tend to spread over a number
of years the incremental cash flows on these options to
executives.
Stock options are not dead. However, at this time their
role as a truly effective incentive for the entrepreneur is
questionable. In addition, it appears that stock options in the
past were too broadly used. Only a ^limited number of executives
occupy positions in the firm in which they can exercise influence
on the long term decisions of the firm.
Today's environment, characterized by a business recession,
an unstable tax situation, and wage and price controls imposed
under President Nixon 1 s economic recovery plan have left many
corporations without a discernable course to follow in the
reformulation of executive compensation plans. The tandem stock
option plans appear to be gaining popularity as the interim form
for preserving the entrepreneurial incentive in the long range
context
.
Much criticism has been leveled at executive compensation
plans in the .past on the basis that they showed an over emphasis
on providing an after tax renumeration to the executive at the
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expense of providing optimal motivation incentives toward,
achieving the objectives of the firm. Therefore, the current
shake up in executive compensation plans is heralded
by some as a
rare opportunity to revise plans to more nearly
meet both the
needs of stockholders and executives.
The stockholders' connection with the firm is
essentially
financial. However, his expectations from the firm
are not so
simply stated. He makes his investment choice
dependent upon the
particular form of financial return such as dividends
or large
growth potential which are compatible with his
needs and propen-
sity for risk aversion. This symbiotic
relationship between the
reputation of the firm and the expectations of the
stockholder
tends to define the objectives of the firm. In addition,
the
image of the firm as a socially responsible
member of the Ameri-
can business community is also an increasingly
important deter-
minant of corporate decisions.
The value of the theories of behavioral
scientists in
unraveling the motivations of executives is
being recognized.
A major impact of this movement is the trend toward
greater
individualization of executive compensation plans.
The individualization programs are generally
based on a
total compensation cost a firm is willing
to pay for a particular
executive. Within this cost limitation there
is customarily a
requirement that a portion of the cost be
allocated to compen-
satory devices which provide entrepreneurial
incentives and




individual executive can then choose any of a number of forms of
compensation with current and deferred payment schedules which
most nearly meet his needs. As an aid in making these decisions,
many corporations are providing executives with computer
simulation models and professional financial planning assistance.
There appears to be increasing recognition that an executive
compensation plan should not only be sensitive to the individual
executive but also that it must be tailored to the company.
Every company is unique in terms of its size, stage of development,
growth opportunities, competitive environment, product mix, and
susceptibility to swings in the cycles of the economic community.
Therefore, a well designed executive compensation program should
be developed to encourage taking advantage of the peculiar
opportunities available to the firm and minimizing the threat of
the dangers it faces in its peculiar economic environment.
This fact dictates that a firm must spend time and effort to
plan and develop a comprehensive executive compensation plan with
the thoroughness with which it undertakes a new product
development or a major capital expenditure. Executive talent is
increasingly being recognized as a major element in the corporate
inventory of capital assets. As with other capital assets, the
executive with high performance potential should be allocated a
complementary portion of corporate wealth,, Likewise, those
executives which have ceased to provide an acceptable return on




CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY
An executive compensation plan must be based on a total
compensation concept if the company is to remain competitive in
attracting, motivating, and keeping top caliber personnel;
provide fair and rational treatment of its various executives;
and control compensation costs and their relationship to the
profitability of the firm. Such a program must be based on a
soundly developed base-salary structure, must contain a number of
fundamental compensation media for use by the firm and must
provide considerable flexibility of application for both the
firm and the individual.
The contents of the executive compensation plan for a
particular firm cannot be prescribed from a list of general
antedotes. The needs and environment of a firm and its executives
are considered subject to sufficient variability to justify the
development of a unique plan for each company,, The variability
of the form in which each of the major compensatory alternatives
is employed should be determined based on an understanding of the
peculiar needs of the firm, its stockholders, and the executives
employed.
The following considerations should be given attention during
the process of developing a comprehensive plan.
• An executive's compensation should be considered in




An executive compensation plan should be based on
flexibility to provide for meeting the varying needs of
the individual and the firm.
A degree of entrepreneurial incentive should be
built into the plan which is compatible with the oppor-
tunities available in the firm.
. A plan should include provisions for providing
unusual compensatory opportunities for venture managers.
A plan should not be built to accomodate particular
tax environments thereby requiring major restructuring at
short intervals.
, A plan should be kept fine-tuned over time to
maintain its appeal and effective contribution to the
changing objectives of the firm and the executive.
The plan should include a provision for providing
sufficient differentiation in monetary awards to ensure
both superior and inferior performance are properly
recognized.
« Non-monetary forms of compensation such as status
symbols, personal counseling services, use of company
recreation facilities or use of company vehicles should be
included in a plan; since, when used discriminately , they
have a high motivational value at a relatively low cost.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
In concluding this study, it has become obvious that the
measurement of top executive performance is an imprecise yet
necessary ingredient for the administration of an effective
executive compensation program. The literature in the field of
executive compensation contains a number of dissertations on the
application of various performance measurement techniques to
allocating bonuses and stock options. However, the tying together
of these approaches into a performance measurement system capable
of meeting the needs of a comprehensive total compensation
package does not seem to have been accomplished. A study in this
area is considered necessary for the development of a means of
administering an executive compensation program.
In the process of conducting this study, a significant
number of references in the literature extolled the virtues of
the entrepreneurial incentive. However, nowhere is there a
discussion of the optimal mix of ownership identity, managerial
ability, business experience, and business environment which
is most likely to foster the attainment of the entrepreneurial
objective. It is felt that a study in this area could result in
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